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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE. QE:f\lEFITS OF ECONOMIC .· . . . 
INTEGRATION FOR THE .ARABIAN GULF STATES: THE: . 
EFFECTS OF INCREASED SIZE 
Robert E. Looney * 
The purpose of this paper is to assese the potential advantages of economic integration, 
and in particular of the resulting economie1 of scale, for the GCC members. What factors 
have contributed to limiting the size of individual country markets for industrial 
products? How important has economic size been in limiting the industrial diversification 
efforts of the member states? Which atates would benefit the most from economic 
integration? 
The main findings of the study are that economic size, especially the small populations of 
these countriea is increasingly limiting the opportunity for expanding induatrial output. AB 
a result, increased income has become a major stimulu1 for non-industrial activities--
services/distribution/ and construction, all of which do not appear to be particularly 
sensitive to economies of scale. Economic integration is particularly important also given 
the declining ability of an increasing share of domestic expenditures to stimulate industrial 
output, i.e., the scope for easy import substitution may be over for most of these 
countries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the signing on 25 May 1981 of the Unified Economic 
Agreement (UEA) Charter creating the Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
GCC has had a growing impact on the economic life of its member 
states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. 
Gulf cooperation, however, predated the creation of the GCC. A 
number of the joint committees and vehicles were formed in the 
1970s and included Iraq as well as the GCC states. The Doha based 
Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) was set up by the 
seven countries in 1976. GOIC helps to establish new industries (such 
as the Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill (Garmco) in Bahrain. Other Gulf 
joint ventures that predated the creation of the GCC include Gulf 
Air, the United Arab Shipping Company, Gulf International Bank and 
* The author is Profe11or at Naval Postgraduate Scfiooi, Monterey, California. 
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the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (owned by the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, OAPEC). 
The impetus towards Gulf cooperation was thus already well 
advanced when the GCC was formed, but the UEA took the process 
much further, aiming ultimately at developing a single regional 
economy. Its six main provisions deal with: (a) trade; (b) freedom of 
movement of capital, individuals and economic activities; (c) 
coordination of development; (d) technical cooperation; (e) transport 
and communications; and (f) financial and monetary cooperation. The 
agreement was complemented by the Gulf Investment Coorporation 
(GIC), which was created in 1982 and began operation in 1984. Based 
in Kuwait, the GIC has authorized a capital of $2.1 billion, of which 
$540 million is paid in, and is mandated to invest in regional 
products. 
The main goal of the GCC states has been to diversify their 
economic structures and reduce their dependence on exports of crude 
oil. However, given that oil and gas are the only resources available to 
them, "basic" or "resource-based" industrialization was chosen as the 
best option, rather than investment in foreign assets or oil 
conservation policies. 
The GCC argues that the first option would encourage downstream 
manufacturing and related activities conducive to the transformation 
of the societies and their economic structures. As Al-Yousuf has 
noted (Al-Yousuf, 1986, p.25), the costs associated with such policies 
are very high, whether these costs are measured in monetary or social 
(environmental, cultural, religious, etc.) terms. 
There seems to be a consensus on the need for some cooperation or 
coordination among the GCC states to minimize the costs of 
economic change. There are two main forms of economic 
integration: a more general one, namely the customs union, and a 
more specific one, namely the joint product approach to sectoral 
integration. The former provides the economic rationale whereas 
the latter provides the modality (Al-Yousuf, 1986, pp.25-26). 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the potential advantages of 
economic integration, and in particular of the resulting economies of 
scale, for the GCC members .. What factors have contributed to 
limiting the size of individual country markets for industrial 
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products? How important has economic size been in limiting the 
industrial diversification efforts of the member states? Which states 
would benefit the most from economic integration? 
2. BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
The traditional welfare effects of integration are trade creation and 
trade diversion. By eliminating tariffs on imports from partners, a 
member will increase total imports. Thus trade creation will have a 
welfare benefit related to the degree of protection formerly in place. 
At the same time, the country may switch purchases away from the 
world market toward its GCC partners as a result of the elimination 
of tariffs on the partners' goods. This substitution, trade diversion, 
causes a welfare cost to the country as it replaces low-cost world 
market supply with higher priced partner supply. The cost depends on 
the differences between the partner's price and the world price. 
In addition to these two traditional static welfare effects, several 
other effects stemming from the formation of a regional common 
market are of potential significance: 
1. labour opportunity cost; 
2. economies of scale; 
3. foreign exchange scarcity. 
Integration causes the country to export more (or new) goods to its 
partners. The resulting increase in output will bring a windfall gain 
insofar as: 
1. labor costs contained in the final price of this output exceed 
labor's "social" or "scarcity" cost; 
2. the increment in output may be achieved with less than 
proportional increase in inputs due to the exploitation of economies 
of scale; 
Finally, if the country increases its exports to partners at no 
expense to its exports to the rest pf the world, and at the same 
time increases by a smaller amount (or even holds constant) its 
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total imports (although replacing world supply with partner 
supply), the country will enjoy a relaxation of its foreign exchange 
constraint. While ex-post total imports will rise to equal the new 
higher availability of foreign exchange, in the process the 
additional scarce imported inputs necessary to raise GNP will have 
been provided; the resulting increase in GNP constitutes the 
"foreign exchange scarcity" welfare gain. 
These five effects are static in that they represent once-and-for-all 
outward shifts in the country's production possibility frontier, given 
its resources. In addition, there are dynamic effects, the most 
important of which are: 
1. structural transformation of the economy (e.g., a shift from 
traditional exports to industrial production); 
2. the investment effect which results from the inflow of foreign 
investment, and the stimulus to domestic investment, which would 
not have occurred in the absence of the market stimulus provided 
by formation of the common market. 
3. the efficiency-prodding influence of competition resulting from 
the freeing of imports for at least the goods of partners. 
The analysis below attempts to identify the benefits to the member 
states of easing the size barrier to industrial expansion. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GCC COUNTRIES 
The GCC countries share a number of common characteristics and 
limitations to further industrialization (El-Kuwaiz, 1987, pp.76-77): 
1. The six member nations are overly dependent on the export of 
crude oil. 
2. Although the private sector has increased its share in the gross 
domestic product of the GCC states from around 30 per cent in the 
early 1970s to almost 55 per cent in the mid-1980s, its role in the 
industrialization process is still below what it should be. 
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3. Given GCC geographic and economic constraints, the group still 
faces a chronic scarcity of both skilled and unskilled human 
resources. 
4. The GCC's domestic markets are limited and highly scattered. 
. . . . .. 
5. If the GCC . concentrates on· international :markets, it. has to 
compete vigorously with the well-established manufacturers in both 
industrial and developing countries. It also has to enter into 
contractual agreements dealing with the very complicated subject 
of international trade, an area for which the GCC as an 
organization and its member states individually have little acquired 
or long-term expertise. 
6. Other than hydrocarbons, the GCC has limited mineral resources 
and a scarcity of water. 
7. Although almost all infrastructure facilities are in place in the 
Arabian Gulf, interconnection among these facilities is almost non-
existent. 
8. Industrial regulations and legislation as well as indust.rial 
incentives are different in nature and application in each of the 
member states. 
9. The Arabian Gulf states do not have an indigenous technological 
base with which to encourage industrial growth and development. 
In terms of the region's integration experience (El-Kuwaiz, 1987, 
p.77): 
1. The main decisions regarding application of national resources 
are still made on the national level. The issue of national 
sovereignty is very dear to the people and leadership in each of the 
six Gulf states. 
2. The GCC, as a regional integration institution, does not have 
power over national entities. In other words, there is as yet no 
GCC supranational government with which regional development 
priorities can effectively supersede nat~onal ones. 
I 
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As El-Kuwai,Z notes, a general concensus among economists is that 
economic integration among nations presupposes a certain degree of 
complementarity; it requires division of labour, mobolization factors 
of production and facilitation of movements of goods across borders. 
The GCC experience, however, is quite different. The GCC member states more 
or less are trading in one line of production, i.e., the export of oil and 
petrole1.111 products. They all illl>Ort their consuner, industrial and other 
required goods from major industrial areas. By il!l>lication, interstate 
trade in the Gulf to any great degree is missing. Thus, liberalization of 
trade by itself would not create economic integration similar to, say the 
European Economic Corrm.mi ty, as targeted in both the GCC Charter and the 
Unified Economic Agreement (El·Kuwa~z, 1987, p.77). 
Given this situation, most of the benefits of integration must by 
necessity arise from the creation of new consumer industries which, 
by taking advantage of economies of scale through regional trade, will 
be more profitable as the integration process develops. 
The importance of economies of scale in the industrial process of 
Arab countries has been confirmed in a major study by M. M. 
Metwally (Bowers, 1979, pp.149-172). After citing a number of cases 
where production was not possible because of limited domestic 
markets, Metwally concluded that a common market between the 
Arab countries: 
Through the pooling of markets would encourage appreciably the development 
of large·scale manufactures. This would hasten growth. So too would the 
intensification of competition if its effect was to increase the efficiency 
of operation of existing industries and hence to initiate a higher 
sustained growth of productivity. 
The above arguments, while powerful, may not convince the Arab 
countries to put aside their political differences and consider carefully 
their new frontier. The backwash effects of an Arab Common Market 
or an Arab Customs Union cannot be ignored. But these effects never 
outweigh the advantages to be gained from concerted action 
(Metwally, 1979, p.162). 
An AaaeBBment of the Benefits of Economic Integration for the Arabian Gulf States 87 
4. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
The Gulf States' accomplishments in the area of industrial 
diversification are impressive when compared with the progress made 
by other Arab countries. For the basis of comparison, an analysis was 
made of the movements over time of tl)e four main components of 
non-:oil Gross Domestic Product manufacturing, construction, services 
and the distributional sectors. Here, the distributional sectors consist 
of: (a) commerce, restaurants, and hotels, (b) transportaion, commerce 
and storage, and (c) finance, insurance and banking. Services include; 
(a) housing, (b) government services, and (c) other services. 
There are serious problems in using movements in sectoral output 
percentages of Gross Domestic Product as a measure of structural 
change in the Arabian Gulf. In particular, because of the dominance 
of hydrocarbons in the economies of most of these countries, 
movements identified by this ratio may be more sensitive to 
developments in the oil sector, rather than expansion (or contraction) 
of individual non-oil sectors. However, the selection of an alternative 
definition of sectoral output--share of non-oil GDP, share of Arab 
world industrial production, etc., would be arbitrary. To overcome 
these problems, an index was created for each of the four main 
sectoral inputs. The index was formed from two measures of each 
sector's output (a) share of non-oil GDP, and (b) absorption (total 
consumption and investment expenditures). 
To avoid using a simple arbitrary weighting system, an orthogonal 
factor analysis was made on the eight observations for each of three 
years: (a) 197 5. the beginning of the oil boom, (b) 1981, the end of 
the oil boom, and (c) 1985, the last year for which comparable data 
were available. The data sample was taken from the Arab Monetary 
Fund (Arab Monetary Fund, 1987) and included the twenty Arab 
members of the Fund. 
The factor analysis identified four main trends in the data. As it 
turned out, the sectoral shares of non-oil GDP and absorption are 
correlated closely enough so that each of the factors represented one 
of the four main sectors. The resulting factor scores for each sector 
(sectorial dimension, Tables 1-3), therefore, represent the relative* 
ranking of each of the twenty countries in terms of the degree of 
• Only the results for the Gulf countriea are reported here. 
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development of each sector relative to the other nineteen Arab 
countries included in the sample (only the results for the six GCC 
countries, together with Libya are presented here). 
More specifically, the factor scores have a mean of zero. The 
country with the highest positive factor score on a particular sector 
possesses the largest share (relative to the other nineteen countries) of 
that sector in its economy. Similarly, the country with the lowest 
(negative) factor score has the smallest share of that sector in its 
economy. The rest of the countries will rank in between. 
To determine the relative importance of economic size on the 
sectoral development of the sample· countries, several additional steps 
were required: 
1. Measures of economic size were introduced into the factor 
analysis. Here, the proxies used for economic size were: (a) the 
share of GDP of Arab world population accounted for by each 
country, and (b) the share of Arab world population possessed by 
each country. 
2. The combined impact of income and population were 
determined by: (a) computing the resulting factor scores for each 
country with these variables in the factor analysis, and (b) 
comparing the results with those obtained from the simple factor 
containing only sectoral variables. 
3. The individual relative importance of income and population 
were derived in a manner identical to (2) above. 
4. As a basis of comparison, estimates were made of the effect of 
domestic expenditures on Gulf industrial diversification efforts. 
Here, domestic expenditures (absorption--total consumption and 
investment minus imports) as a percentage of absorption were 
introduced into the sectoral factor analysis. The factor scores thus 
obtained were compared with the sectoral factor analysis. The 
factor scores thus obtained were compared with the sectoral 
dimension in a manner similar to (2) above. 
Several interesting trends were identified. At the beginning of the 
period under consideration, 1975 (Table 1): 
• 
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1. Bahrain was by far the leading Gulf country in terms of the 
relative development of its manufacturing sector. In fact, Saudi 
Arabia was the only other country that even remotely approached 
Bahrain in terms of the degree of industrial diversification. 
2. While Qatar and Kuwait had pos1t1ve factor scores on 
manufacturing, thus identifying these countries as relatively 
industrialized compared to the Arab world countries as a whole, 
the U AE and Oman had very high negative factor scores, placing 
them among the least industrialized Arab world countries. 
3. As might have been anticipated, the Gulf countries were 
characterized by relative development of their oil revenue financed 
construction and service sectors. With the notable exception of the 
UAE and Qatar, distributive trades were underdeveloped in the 
Gulf. 
By 1980 (Table 2): 
1. Although losing a bit of its initial lead in relative industrial 
development, Bahrain still led the other Gulf countries in the share 
of economic activity accounted for by manufacturing. 
2. Largely as a result of initiating a large oil financed investment 
programme, the UAE had made the most dramatic gains toward 
industrial diversification. 
3. While still possessing uniformly high levels of development of 
the service and construction sectors, most Gulf states began to 
show significant development of their distributive activities. 
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Table 1 
Arab World: Effects of Economic Size on Relative Industrialisation, 1975 
(Standardized Regresaion Coefficients) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor4 
Manufact. Conatruct. Distrib. Population 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimenaion 
mari.ufact/gdp 0.9S* -0.11 0.09 0.14 
services/ absor 0.91* 0.00 0.08 -0.34 
manufact/absor 0.89* -0.15 0.26 0.23 
construct/absor -0.07 0.91* 0.32 -0.01 
construct/ gdp -0.23 0.90* 0.12 -0.12 
Share of GDP 0.28 0.11• -0.45 0.39 
distribut/aba o.so 0.10 0.97* 0.35 
distribut/gdp 0.05 O.S4 0.76* -0.23 
Share of Population 0.10 0.02 -0.12 0.84* 
services \gdp 0.59 0.10 -0.34 -0.69* 
(Factor Scores) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor4 
Manufact. Construct. Distrib. Serv. 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
UAE -1.15 2.00 1.88 -0.90 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.91 -0.01 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.58 1.10 -0.21 . 0.59 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.84 0.13 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.83 -0.50 2.08 
Libya -0.73 0.98 -0.60 1.35 
Oil Economies Income and Population Effects 
UAE _..,,p 1.73. =~ , ... r) Bahrain 2.10 - -0.69 1.26 +) Saudi Arabia 1.40 +~ 1.94 +) -1.69 -) 
Oman -1.22 + 0.8S -) -0.25 =) 
Qatar 0.04 t) 1.20 -) 1.79 ~=) 
Kuwait 0.86 +~ -0.18 :~ -1.22 - ~ Libya -0.14 + 1.08 -0.96 (-
Note: (a) Sectoral Dimension = country scores derived from factor analysis omitting 
population and income effects. 
(b) ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor scores . 
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Table 2 
Arab World: Effects of Economic Size on Relative Industrialiution, 1980 
(Standardized Regreaaion Coefficients) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor<& 
Construct. Manu!act. Serv. Distrib. 
Oil Economiea Sectoral Dimension 
construct/gdp 0.94• ~0.17 0.08 0.12 
Share of GDP 0.9s• 0.24 -0.15 -0.26 
construct/ absor o.oo• -0.01 0.12 0.20 
manufact / absor -0.08• 0.9S* 0.08 0.12 
manufact/gdp 0.11 0.92* 0.09 0.05 
services/gdp 0.16 o.os 0.94* -0.lS 
servicea / absor -0.09 0.88 0.86* -0.04 
Share of Population 0.07 0.58* -0.64* -0.11 
distribut/gdp 0.16 -0.07 -0.06 0.96* 
distribut/abeor -0.12 O.S6 0.07 0.87* 
(Factor Score•) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor<& 
Manufact. Construct. Distrib. Serv. 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
UAE -0.22 1.68 1.47 -0.81 
Bahrain 2.26 -0.SS 1.94 0.56 
Saudi Arabia 0.02 2.07 -0.95 0.24 
Oman -1.82 0.19 1.27 0.10 
Qatar 0.06 0.67 0.97 2.07 
Kuwait 0.70 -0.24 O.S2 1.52 
Libya -1.10 1.23 -0.91 0.65 
Oil Economiea Income and Population 
UAE 
-0.61 f-~ 1.25 ~ - ~ 1.71 ~+) -O.S2 f +~ 
Bahrain 1.7S - -0.50 - 1.97 =) 0.88 + 
Saudi Arabia 0.20 f +) 2.66 ~+) -1.12 ~-) o.o. r) 
Oman -0.06 -) 1.32 =) 0.25 +) 
Qatar -~:!~ !:::l 0.29q 1.08 ~+) 2.02 =~ Kuwait 0.66 = -0.10 - 0.22 -) 1.45 = 
Libya -1.04 = 1.04 (- -0.7S (-) 0.68 (= 
Note: (a) Sectoral Dimension = country ecorea derived Crom factor analysis omitting 
population and income effects. 
(b) ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor scores. 
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Table S 
Arab World: Effect. of Economic 
Size on Relative Industrialization, 1985 
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Income and Size Effects 










































Note: (a) Sectoral Dimension = country scores derived from factor analysis omitting 
population and income effects. 
(b) ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor scores. 
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Finally, by 1985 (Table 3): 
1. Partially as a result of oil based expansion in neighbouring 
countries, particularly the UAE and Qatar, Bahrain had suffered a 
significant decline in its level of industrial diversification. 
2. In general, over the ten year period between 1975 and 1985, the 
Gulf countries were most successful at expanding their construction 
sectors. They also had significant expansions of their distribution 
and service sectors, but lagged in their industrial diversification 
efforts. 
To determine the role of economic size in affecting the sectoral 
patterns described above, population and income variables were added 
to the four sector factor analysis. As noted earlier, both population 
and size variables were specified as the country share of each in the 
Arab world. The results (top of Tables 1-3) indicate that in recent 
years population has had the greatest impact on industrial 
diversification, with GDP more highly correlated with construction 
activity. Specifically: 
I. In 1975 neither GDP nor population were highly associated with 
industrial diversification. At this time, GDP was becoming 
associated with the development of construction activities, while 
larger populations were not necessarily associated with any one 
sector's development. 
2. In fact, population was an independent dimension in the data, 
with manufacturing and service activities highly correlated, i.e., the 
development of manufacturing was highly correlated with 
expansion of service sector activities (or vice versa). 
By 1980 (Table 2): 
1. Manufacturing was increasingly associated with patterns of 
income and population, with the standardized regression coefficient 
of population (0.58) about twice as high as that for income (0.24). 
2. Development of the construction sector was increasingly a 
function of income, while larger populations were not associated 
with sector expansion other than in the industrial areas. 
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By 1985 (Table 3 ), the picture had stabilized to the extent that: 
1. There was a strong association with market size, as proxied by 
population and relative industrial diversification. 
2. Higher levels of income were an important factor in facilitating 
industrial diversification, but only to half the extent of population. 
In terms of individual countries, size effects (combined population 
and income effects) were significant for many of the GCC countries. 
Since both income and size were correlated with industrial 
diversification, a higher factor score with these variables included in 
the factor analysis (relative to that obtained with these variables 
omitted) indicated the degree to which industrial diversification had 
been aided by relatively large markets: 
1. In 1975 (Table 1), Saudi Arabia achieved the biggest stimulus 
from market size, with Kuwait also benefiting from its overall 
level of population and income. On the other hand, the industrial 
diversification of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE was considerably 
below what it might have been in the context of expanded 
populations/income. 
2. By 1980 (Table 2) the industrial diversification efforts of the 
UAE and Bahrain were becoming constrained by their limited 
economic size. While Saudi Arabia was enjoying increased benefits 
from its relatively large economic size, these advantages were less 
than those enjoyed in 1975. 
3. Finally, in 1985, the situation had further deteriorated for the 
UAE, Bahrain and Qatar. Each of these countries had considerable 
absolute expansion in manufacturing activity, but clearly this 
expansion was below what would likely have taken place in a 
larger market environment. 
4. Economic size played a relatively minor role in influencing non-
manuf acturing sectoral patterns of output. 
In terms of the individual components (population, income) of 
economic size: 
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Table 4 
Bahrain: Effects of Economic 
Size on Relative Industrialization, 1975 
(Factor Scores) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor4 
Manufact. Construct. Distrib. Serv. 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimt'lnsion 
UAE -1.15 2.00 1.88 -0.90 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.91 -0.01 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.63 1.10 -0.21 0.59 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.84 0.13 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.83 -0.50 2.08 
Libya -0.73 0.98 -0.60 1.35 
Oil Economies Income Effect 
UAE -1.06 (+) 1.87 -) 1.55 (-) -1.01 (-) 
Bahrain 2.41 ~-) -0.58 -) 1.10 ~ +) 0.38 ~+) 
Saudi Arabia 1.45 +) 2.02 +) -1.84 -) 0.36 -) 
Oman 
-1.63 ~-~ 0.73 =~ 0.03 ~+~ 0.48 ~ -) Qatar -0.07 - 1.21 2.01 + 0.45 +) 
Kuwait 0.20 ~+) -0.41 f +) -0.82 f -) 1.89 f -) 
Libya -0.74 =) 0.92 =) -0.58 =) 1.28 =) 
Oil Economies Population Effect 
UAE 
-1.15 ~=) 1.99 (=i 1.91 (=) -0.83 (+) 
Bahrain 2.72 =~ -0.38 f = 0.90 ~=~ -0.20 ~ -) Saudi Arabia 0.89 = 1.05 = -0.99 = 0.62 +) 
Oman 
-1.53 ~=~ u•ri -0.15 ~=~ 0.76 ~+) Qatar 0.35 = 1.83 = 1.79 = -0.03 -) Kuwait 0.07 ~=~ -0.83 =~ -0.42 f =~ 1.16 f-> Libya -0.68 = 1.00 = -0.59 = 1.40 =) 
Oil Economies Domestic Expenditure Effect 
UAE -0.88 +) 2.11 t) 1.75 (=) 
-1.04 t Bahrain 3.27 +) -0.24 -) 1.01 ~+) 0.26 +~ 
Saudi Arabia 0.82 =) 0.83 +~ :~:~ r? 0.69 = Oman -1.06 +) 1.49 f + 0.25 ~-) Qatar 0.02 -) 1.45 -) 1.95 =) 0.37 +) 
Kuwait -0.08 =~ -0.74 ~=~ -0.62 -) 1.99 ~=) Libya -0.98 1.05 = -0.66 =) 1.23 -) 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor score11. 
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I. Income was initially (1975, Table 4) the stronger of the two, 
giving particular stimulus in the UAE, Bahrain and Oman to 
industrial diversification efforts. 
2. At the same time Qatar and Kuwait would have achieved greater 
industrial diversification if their incomes had been greater. 
3. Given the pattern of industrial development at this time, 
population was not a major factor in either aiding or hindering 
industrial activities. Apparently, given the types of local consumer 
good industries, economies of scale were not a major factor in 
affecting profitability in manufacturing. 
4. By 1980 (Table 5), both population and income effects were 
constraining industrial diversification in the UAE and Bahrain. 
Saudi Arabia was also finding population a factor constraining its 
industrialization efforts. 
5. Finally, in 1985 (Table 6) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were 
experiencing positive income effects on industrial activity, with 
Saudi Arabia also receiving a slight stimulus from the relatively 
large size of its population. The industrial diversification in the 
UAE, Qatar and Bahrain was constrained by both small populations 
and limited incomes. Kuwait was now experiencing a retarding 
effect on its industrialization as a result of its relatively small 
population. 
To a certain extent, the GCC countries have been able to contain 
the problems presented by their relatively small economic sizes, 
through expanding domestic expenditures, i.e., import substitution 
policies re-directing demand from imports towards new local 
producers. This effect is measured by the impact of domestic 
expenditures as a share of total absorption on sectoral output: 
I. In 1975 (Table 4), the UAE, Bahrain and Oman were able to 
take advantage of the stimulating effects stemming from the large 
proportion of their expenditures that was oriented towards the 
domestic market. 
2. By 1980 (Table 5), however, only Bahrain was continuing to use 
the domestic market effectively in expanding industrial output. 
l ~ 
I 
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3. Finally in 1985 (Table 6) Oman and Qatar had managed to offset 
some of their size disadvantages by expanding the proportion of 
expenditures allocated to domestic goods. Given the limited oil 
reserves of each country, the scope of off setting the disadvantages 
of size must be considered somewhat limited. 
. .. ·.· .. -. 
Table 5 
Bahrain: Effect. of Economic 
Size on Relative Induatriali&ation, 1980 
(Factor Scores) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor-& 
Manufact. Con1truct. Di1trib. Serv. 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
UAE -0.22 1.68 1.47 -0.81 
Bahrain 2.26 -0.SS 1.94 0.56 
Saudi Arabia 0.02 2.07 -0.95 0.24 
Oman -1.82 0.19 1.27 0.10 
Qatar 0.06 0.67 0.97 2.07 
Kuwait 0.70 -0.24 0.32 1.52 
Libya -1.10 1.23 -0.91 0.65 
Oil Economiea Income Effect 
UAE 
-0.36 (- ~ 1.29 (-) 1.62 f +) -0.66 (+) 
Bahrain 2.13 -
-0.'6 i=l 1.87 =) o.··r Saudi Arabia 0.17 +) 2.65 +) -1.11 -) :::; ;l Oman -1.84 ~l -0.05 - ~ 1.SS f =? Qatar -0.0S 0.29 - 1.13 + 2.U = Kuwait 0.74 -0.09 ~+) 0.21 f-~ 1.44 f = Libya -1.17 1.05 -) -0.72 - 0.71 = 
Oil Economiea Population Effect 
UAE 
-0.49n 1.65 (=~ 1.56 (=) -0.46 ~-) 
Bahrain 1.81 -
-0 ... r 2.Mr 0.88 +) Saudi Arabia 0.07 - 2.09 = -~:: ~i 0.18 =) Oman 
-t.7Tl 0.18 -) 0.18 f => Qatar 0.13 = 0.67 =~ 0.94 = 1.96 +) 
Kuwait 0.62 = 
-0.26 ~= 0.34 f= 1.54 f +) 
Libya -1.00 = 1.22 = -0.92 = 0.62 =) 
Oil Economiea Domeatic Expenditure Effect 
UAE -0.26 (=) 1.66 (=) 1.36 (-) -0.82 (=) 
Bahrain 2.S7f+) -0.27 ~~ .... r) 0.66 f +) Saudi Arabia 0.08 =) 2.09 
-0.73 -~ 0.28 =) 
Oman 
-t.87 i=i 0.18 -) 1.10 - 006 i=i Qatar 0.00 = 0.66 =) 0.77 - 2. 1  
Kuwait 0.71 ~= -0.23 ~~ 0.45 f +~ 1.58 f = Libya -1.04 = 1.24 -0.74 + 0.68 = 
Note: ( ) indicate• movement in rankini relative to eector dimeneion factor 1core1. 
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Table 6 
Bahrain: Effecta of Economic 
Si&e on Relative Industrialization, 1986 
(Factor Scores) 
Factorl Factor2 Factors Factor4 
Manufact. Construct. Distribut. Serv. 
Oil Economies Sectorial Dimension 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.84 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.69 
Saudi Arabia -0.16 1.60 -0.78 0.67 
Oman -1.68 0.89 1.11 0.23 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.76 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Libya -0.94 1.68 -0.83 1.04 
Oil Economies Income Effect 
UAE 1.23 (-~ 0.98 (-) 1.48 (=) 0.14(+) 
Bahrain 0.70 f - 0.08 f-) 2.04 ~=) 0.76 f +) 
Saudi Arabia 0.06 +) 2.23 +) -0.97 -) 0.28 -) 
Oman 
-1.60 ~=) 0.18 ~-~ 1.16 f =) 0.30 f =~ Qatar 0.62 -) -0.08 - 0.31 +) 2.81 = 
Kuwait -0.27~+) -0.60 f +) -0.38 ~-) 0.78~-) 
Libya -1.12 =) 1.20 -) -0.64 +) 1.18 +) 
Oil Economies Population Effect 
UAE 0.83 (-) 1.22 (=) 1.60 (+) 0.41 t~ Bahrain 0.43 ~ -) 0.40 ~= 2.06 ~=~ 0.86 + Saudi Arabia -0.06 +) 1.60 = -0.81 = 0.41 =) 
Oman 
-1.46 ~=) 0.89 ~= 1.08 ~=~ 0.09 f-) Qatar 0.48 -) 0.30 = 0.26 = 2.67 =) 
Kuwait 
-0.62 f-) -0.87 ~= 
-0.21 f =~ 0.94 f =) 
Libya -0.88 =) -0.88 -) -0.86 = 0.83 -) 
Oil Economies Domestic Expenditure Effect 
UAE 1.14 (-) 1.10 (-) 1.38 (=) -0.06 (=) 
Bahrain 0.42 f-) 0.11 ~ - ~ .. ,. r) 1.19 ~+~ Saudi Arabia -0.22 =) 1.43 - -0.67 =) 0.76 + 
Oman 
-1.27 f +~ 0.89 ~=) 1.06 =) 0.80 ~=) Qatar 1.40 + 0.74 +) -0.68 -) 1.96 -) 
Kuwait 
-0.42 f =) -0.87 ~=) -0.16 ~=) 1.81 ~+) 
Libya -0.41 +) 1.78 +) -1.20 -) 0.62 -) 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor scores. 
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S. CONCLUSIONS--POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The pace of integration among the GCC countries has slowed in 
recent years as a number of problems have mounted. In the view of 
Abdullah El-Kuwaiz, the GCC's Assistant Secretary General for 
economic affairs, the six main problem areas currently facing the 
GCC include*: . · · · 
1. Allowing GCC nationals to own shares in companies in other 
GCC countries 
2. Establishing a common· external tariff system 
3. Allowing banks in one GCC country to open branches in others 
4. Trying to coordinate the licensing of industrial projects in order 
to avoid duplication 
5. Introducing common airline policies. 
Not only are the Gulf states reluctant to concede their sovereignty 
but, despite their apparent homogeneity, they are at differing levels 
of development. GCC economies are anyway not complementary. 
being dominated for the most part by exports of oil and oil products, 
while importing large volumes of consumer, industrial and other 
goods from the industrialized world. Of itself, therefore, liberalization 
of trade will not create economic integration. Dr. El-Kuwaiz thinks 
the GCC needs to create productive capacity first since this in turn 
would promote integration (El-Kuwaiz, 1987, p.23). The results 
presented above are entirely consistent with this view. 
Theoretically, economic integration in the form of a customs union 
can be justified as beneficial if at least one of the following 
arguments hold (Al-Yousuf, pp.26-27): 
I. The public good argument. The development of an industrial 
sector is assumed to have certain public good characteristics; it is 
regarded as essential because health, education and defense 
programmes for the industrial sector indirectly contribute to the 
economic development and security of the country. 
• Quoted in Arabian Peninsula: Econ.omic Structu.re and. Analy1i1 by. the Economiat 
Intelligence Unit, 1988, pp.22-23. 
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2. The economies of scale argument. By forming a customs union 
the enlarged internal market could be captured by the most 
efficient producer which could lower prices even further because 
of the economies of large-scale production. 
-3. The terms of trade argument. A counrty could improve its terms 
of trade by imposing a tariff (tax) on its imports (exports) if it 
accounts for a sufficiently large proportion of world trade to 
influence world prices. Alternatively, it might use its economic 
power to obtain more favourable deals in economic bargaining 
process. 
While all three arguments are likely to be valid for integration 
among the GCC countries, the analysis above has indicated that the 
economies of scale associated with increased integration of the 
member countries may be a critical factor in determining the success 
these countries have in meeting their prime economic priority, 
industrial diversification. 
The results presented above indicate that economic size, especially 
the small populations of these countries is increasingly limiting the 
opportunity for expanding industrial output. As a result, increased 
income has become a major stimulus for non-industrial activities--
services/distribution/and construction, all of which do not appear to 
be particularly sensitive to economies of scale. 
Economic integration is particularly important also given the 
declining ability of an increasing share of domestic expenditures to 
stimulate industrial output, i.e., the scope for easy import substitution 
may be over for most of these countries. 
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